LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

CASE NO. 07-01140 MHP

copy of the letter I wrote to Mr. Porter after our telephone conversation.

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3. I was out-of-state on Monday, June 25 and Tuesday, June 26. My voice-mail greeting
indicated that I would check my voice-mail messages and return calls as my schedule allowed. I
returned Mr. Porter's voice-mail message on Wednesday morning, June 27, upon my return to the
office. He was not available when I called, and so I left him a message, which he returned shortly
thereafter. We discussed his request that AMCO stipulate to a continuance of the hearing on its
motion for summary judgment so that he could conduct certain depositions, and he identified the three
persons he wished to depose. When I asked what information he hoped to obtain via the depositions
that he did not already have, he stated he wanted to learn "why AMCO made no effort to settle"
Plaintiff's underinsured motorist claim. Attached hereto and marked Exhibit A is a true and correct

part of Judge Brazil's original scheduling order and, I presume, that order is in the Court's file.

- As noted in the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, Plaintiff has not yet made the required Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 initial disclosures, which were due to be made, per Judge Brazil earlier scheduling order, on May 29, 2007. Mr. Porter had advised in the days before the due date that he did not think he would be able to meet the deadline but that he would be able to make the disclosures by the end of that week, which ended on Friday, June 1, 2007. With the understanding that Mr. Porter needed a few extra days to prepare and make Plaintiff's initial disclosures, I agreed that such timeline would be acceptable. Mr. Porter did not abide by his own representation regarding when Plaintiff's initial disclosures would be made.
- 5. AMCO filed its motion for summary judgment when it did because it does not believe that the pertinent facts are in dispute and that this case can be resolved without the need for expensive and time-consuming discovery. The underlying facts are, or should be, well-known to Plaintiff and her counsel given their intimate involvement with those facts for at least the last five years.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed this 29th day of June, 2007, at San Francisco, California.

EXHIBIT "A"

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

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STEPHEN J. LIBERATORE

June 27, 2007

FILE NO. 26198-131

DIRECT DIAL: 415.262.8510 E-MAIL: liberatore@lbbslaw.com

Via Facsimile Transmission to (415) 391-9515

David M. Porter, Esq. Law Offices of David M. Porter 101 California Street, Suite 2050 San Francisco, CA 94111

Re:

Christine Dougherty v. AMCO Insurance Company U.S. District Court, Northern District of California Case No. C 07 1140 MHP (removed from San Francisco County Superior Court, Case No. C04-433301)

Dear Mr. Porter:

This letter confirms our telephone conversation this date.

You had left me a telephone voice-mail message requesting that AMCO stipulate to a continuance of the hearing on its pending motion for summary judgment to allow Plaintiff to conduct discovery. In our discussion, I asked what information you believe you need to obtain in discovery (via interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and/or deposition) in order to oppose the motion.

You indicated that you want to depose Jeff Mangone (the claim adjuster who handled Ms. Dougherty's underinsured motorist claim), his supervisor, and AMCO attorney Renton Rolph. Though you indicated that you did not wish to debate to motion or the facts of the case, you stated your general thought that AMCO's motion is premature. You stated that you want to find out why, as you put it, AMCO made no effort to settle the case. You expressed your view that the Rappaport-Scott case does not stand for the principle for which AMCO cited it in its motion. You also advised that Judge Patel's clerk had indicated to you that AMCO's motion for summary judgment may violate her standing order. Also, you stated that you believe Rule 56 entitles Plaintiff to the requested continuance.

While I appreciate your outlining the discovery you want to undertake, I am still uncertain what relevance that discovery has to Plaintiff's opposition to AMCO's motion for summary judgment. Simply put, this case presents a difference of opinion regarding the value of Plaintiff's

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TUCSON 520.202.2565 LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

David M. Porter, Esq. June 27, 2007 Page 2

claim against Mr. Osmidoff; as stated in Mr. Mangone's numerous communications with Mr. Murphy, AMCO believed that Plaintiff had been adequately compensated for her injuries by the monies she had already received, and invited Plaintiff to submit additional information. No additional information was forthcoming. All of this is memorialized in the claim file materials that were previously produced to Plaintiff.

I do not wish to put Plaintiff (and you) to the task of motion practice if we can agree that it is not necessary, and so I invite you to provide further explanation regarding how the discovery you wish to conduct is relevant to the issues presented by AMCO's motion. Please feel free to contact me at your convenience to discuss this issue further.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Very truly yours,

Stephen J. Liberatore of

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

SJL:ask

cc: Stephen M. Murphy, Esq. (via fax: (415) 986-1231)